In "Foucault Pumped: Body Politics and the Muscled Woman," Honi Fern Haber argues that because patriarchy reduces women to mere bodies, feminists can and should use their bodies to strategically oppose patriarchy. Drawing on a Foucauldian understanding of the relation between power and aesthetics, Haber claims that by making women"s bodies visually subversive and empowering, body building is a practice of feminist resistance. This essay will begin with a discussion of Haber"s paper followed by a critique based on a Foucauldian conception of ethics.
that like all good metaphors, will reshape our ways of seeing" (153). Haber hopes this "revisioning" will do more than force unconventional readings of women"s bodies: it should open up new, non-phallocentric ways of understanding ourselves and each other (154).
In order to play this resistant role, the muscled woman"s body must be "immediately and obviously-even shockingly-present" (Haber 142 ). This means huge muscles; the "revolting" aspects of the muscled woman"s body must be inscribed in plain sight in order to force the necessary re-readings. For this reason, the bodies of other female athletes will not suffice, for although these women may be physically strong and feel empowered, "such internal feelings do not problematise seeing, and the need for such problematising is my thesis, the achievement of such, my goal" (Haber 143 ). These women"s bodies are too easily read as normal, even attractive, by phallocentric standards.
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While she finds the image of the female body builder very promising, Haber admits that getting "pumped" is not a straightforward solution to the problem of phallocentric power.
Foucault writes that resistance comes from within power, and Haber understands this as a threat.
Haber warns that the dangers of co-optation and collusion are always present, and thus muscled women must be alert for the "power [which] is always lurking on the other side of resistance" (Haber 153) . 3 The muscled woman"s body will be interpreted within the structures of power, "at the mercy of readings (and subject to misreadings)," and her body"s resistant value may be lost in translation (Haber 146) . Female muscle may be sold as the key to health, or her body will be read as an attempt to be more manly, reinforcing masculine superiority (Haber 152) . On the other hand, if the concept of femininity expands to include muscle, the muscled woman is also disempowered: this expansion "defuses the radical import of the image by making it one more possibility for that which arouses phallocentric desire" (Haber 152) . If the "male gaze" can read the muscled woman"s body as attractive or feminine, then her resistance has failed. 4 Haber is also concerned that women will not find their subversive muscles empowering due to the influence of normalized desires. Haber writes, "women are not just subjected to these [normalized phallocentric] desires; they also constitute themselves as subjects defined by such desires" (141). 5 Power is not only oppressive but constructive; it creates subjectivities, identities, pleasures, and desires. Through the production of normalized (i.e., phallocentric) desires, power makes women "come to desire the very same things that limit our life choices" (Haber 140 ).
Drawing on the work of Sandra Bartky, Haber notes that many women"s self-worth is premised on male approval; for some women, this includes the need to feel desired by men (147).
Bodybuilder and feminist scholar Leslie Heywood describes this sentiment, noting female body builder"s anxiety and fear over the "loss of approval, acceptance and love that acceding to the norm brings them" (Heywood, Bodymakers 33) . Furthermore, since the muscled woman"s body puts the normalized femininity into question, Haber"s shocking aesthetics may threaten women"s identities as fundamentally sexed beings. Preserving and cultivating this fundamentally feminine sense of self motivates the normalized bodies Haber wants women to reject.
Haber complains that "many women, even those who may seem to be the embodiment of radical possibilities, do not want to be liberated from phallocentric desire" (149) . While these women"s bodies may not conform to phallocentric ideals, the hope of being desirable by phallocentric criteria is not easily abandoned. The connection of power and identity explains why many women are not interested in fighting patriarchal power: "women act in collusion with patriarchal power because they are constituted within discourses that give "woman" meaning as subjects of the male gaze" (Haber 141 ).
Thus the rejection of the normalized feminine body through the construction of a "revolting" one may require a radical reconstruction of (feminine) self-identity, an understandably daunting task, even for those with pressing political agendas. For these reasons, even those women who choose a muscled body for feminist reasons may find it hard to overcome normalized desires. Haber notes that breasts are often central to women"s sense of self-worth. She asks, what happens to the self-esteem of the female bodybuilder whose breasts" size shrinks significantly when she loses body fat, or whose breasts develop stretch marks from doing flies?…what if she does mind, and minds so much that she comes to hate herself (her body)? In such an instance even if her body is subversive, it will not be liberating. (Haber 156) 6 It seems that even with the best feminist intentions there is a worrying conflict between presenting a subversive aesthetic and being empowered by it. Haber admits that this means the resistance she advocates is problematic: "it becomes very difficult to imagine where a chosen, and phenomenologically empowering, self-conscious resistance would come from, or why it would occur" (148). In the face of this difficulty, Haber simply reiterates that normalized desires are bad for women: "we must not minimize the threat that present desire poses to the lives of all women" (151). Therefore, these desires, and the normalized bodies they produce, should be rejected. Haber suggests that if women find the results of muscled resistance too painful, they should choose another form of bodily protest (Haber 156 Foucault"s account of ethics will thus be helpful here.
According to Foucault, ethics can be understood as the actions or practices of the self on the self with the aim of making, developing, or transforming the self to reach a particular state of being ("The Ethics of the Concern of the Self" 291). In other words, ethics involves the relationship of the self with the self and the activities which create and develop identities (Foucault, "On the Genealogy" 263) . Understood in this manner, ethics is not a certain set of rules but rather consists of practices of self-transformation, which may or may not be in relation to moral codes. Foucault describes these practices as technologies of the self, the activities which individuals undertake "on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality" ("Technologies of the Self" 225). While we may still understand the body as inscribed by power, and identities and desires as a product of power, this power is exercised, at least in part, by the self on the self through the practice of ethics.
Weight loss programs, beauty techniques, and the other "phallocentric" aesthetic practices Haber critiques can be understood as technologies of the self, though they are subject to normalization. 8 As normalizing practices, they create and reinforce subjectivities or identities to which individuals must conform (Heyes 118) . This is precisely Haber"s complaint about normalizing phallocentric power; there are a very limited number of ways in which a woman can be attractive by phallocentric standards, but all women are expected to work toward this telos and are judged according to their deviation from it. A woman knows that "whatever else she may become, she is importantly a body designed to please or to excite" (Bartky 81). 9 As Haber argues, the practices (i.e., ethical activities) undertaken toward this telos contribute to the construction of women"s bodies and identities as objects of the phallocentric gaze.
Though technologies of the self can be normalizing, Foucault suggests that ethics can also be a means of resisting or opposing normalization. Instead of requiring individuals to conform to some restrictive normative identity or subjectivity, ethics as resistance will be based on freedom. For Foucault, freedom is a fundamental correlate to power. Power relations necessarily allow for the possibility to alter and modify these relations, in other words, to resist PhaenEx certain moves or tactics of power through the strategic utilization of power (Foucault, " End of the Monarchy of Sex" 224). 10 The capacity to negotiate power relations in ways that might change those relations is freedom. As Jana Sawicki notes, this capacity importantly includes the ability to question and challenge received identities and values (101).
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Where there is no freedom, there is no power-only domination (Foucault, Foucault, subjectivities, identities, or ways of being-in other words, the self-are not necessary, static, or innate, but are constituted, developed, and maintained through the workings of power, including technologies of the self. In order to resist normalization and its restrictions on modes of existence, the identities and values normalization presents as essential, and in relation to which our selves have been constituted, must be put into question. This questioning or "problematisation" of normalized identities is necessary to take up non-normalizing technologies of the self (Markula and Pringle 145) . Through the practice of non-normalizing technologies of the self, we can attempt to cultivate new selves, new identities, new ways of being that are not restricted by normalization. In other words, ethics as a practice of freedom suggests that we may resist the normalized identities and bodies we have been given and take up our own existence as a work of art.
Foucauldian ethics can be understood as an aesthetics of existence. This is a consequence of Foucault"s conception of the self as constructed, developed, modified by power (including technologies of the self) and the possibility to exercise this power over ourselves through ethics. Scholar Sylvia Pritsch describes this self as "a space of styling" (122). Style is simply the thoughtful practice of ethics as a self-forming activity. As artists of our own lives, we can use the tools provided to us by our cultures and societies to modify, create, and develop our capacities, strengths, and identities. 12 It is important to note that this self-styling is not about applying current aesthetic values to one"s life. Making a "beautiful life" by contemporary Western standards would hardly escape normalization. Rather, understanding the self as a work of art emphasises creativity and freedom in the cultivation of one"s ways of being. It also necessitates a constant critical attitude toward one"s own work, which may lead to the use of "diverse practices" , and a focus on the process of making art rather than on the product. McWhorter writes, "art, in its living and working out, is not about accomplishment. It is about energy and time and discipline and self-criticism and pursuit and letting go. Art is not about being. It is about becoming" (Bodies and Pleasures 227).
Let us now bring this Foucauldian ethics to bear on Haber"s suggestions. Foucault identified four aspects of technologies of the self, which we may use to analyse Haber"s project as a potential ethical activity. The first aspect is the ethical substance, or the part of the self which is ethically or morally relevant (Foucault, "On the Genealogy" 263). For Haber, the ethical substance in question is the female body, and more generally, feminine identity. The second aspect is the mode of subjection, or the reasons or justification to engage in ethical projects (Foucault, "On the Genealogy" 264). Haber provides feminist justification: she wishes to overthrow the patriarchy, and more specifically, disrupt the phallocentric desire that limits women"s aesthetic self-presentations and their identities. The next aspect is ethical work, "selfforming activity," or the means of transforming the self into an ethical subject (Foucault, "On the Genealogy" 265). Haber points to body building; it is through body building that the feminist subject becomes ethical (i.e., resistant to phallocentric norms). The final aspect is the telos, or goal-the type of individual toward which the ethical practice aims (Foucault, "On the Genealogy" 265).
Haber"s telos worries me. The aim of Haber"s project is, in broad terms, to liberate women from the limitations of phallocentric desire and patriarchal power. More specifically, the goal is to embody an image that is both subversive of phallocentric power, via the radicality of imagery, and empowered. 13 The female body must be made into an image so radical that it is in visible opposition to, or contravention of, the normative standards of female attractiveness.
Haber insists on this radicality precisely to avoid, if at all possible, its reabsorption or "translation" back into normative phallocentric power. There are at least two flaws in this strategy.
McWhorter and Heyes caution that resistance to normalization cannot simply posit "better" identities as the telos of ethical practices: "resistance to these [normalized] constraints … cannot simply invoke alternative substantive accounts of the kinds of subjects we would be better off being, since these accounts will have their own apparatus of normalization" (Heyes 118 ). Any supposed resistance invoking a new and improved self as telos creates a normalizing force. The new ideal must be strived for, individuals will be measured against it, and once again ways of being are limited. It seems this is precisely what Haber is doing. By insisting that women"s bodies are better off "radical" or "revolting" in reference to the phallocentric ideal,
Haber is positing a new normative ideal. One could argue that Haber might not be concerned with new normalizing schemas, so long as they are not phallocentric or patriarchal ones.
Nonetheless, Haber claims to be worried about the limitations on women"s possibilities, which all normalizing schemas necessarily create.
While Haber does not advocate that all women take up the muscled body, her criteria for being "revolting" would seem to stand no matter what kind of bodily resistance is chosen. She suggests other types of bodies might also participate in aesthetic resistance to patriarchy: "bodies practicing homosexual or lesbian revolts, flagrantly tattooed bodies, flagrantly ambiguous bodies, wrinkled bodies, bodies that take up space, bodies that refuse to wear prostheses, surgically constructed bodies" (Haber 154). 14 These bodies are also subject to evaluation according to some radical ideal. One wonders how radical is radical enough. Failure to conform to norms linked to identity can be especially painful, and so especially motivational. Such norms, femininity being a prime example, present themselves as integral to human well-being, and the practices toward these ends are presented as necessary. Heyes notes that such practices "also often tacitly insist on their own transcendent status outside any politics of truth, and represent themselves as essential to human flourishing" (117). It seems impossible to be happy or fulfilled without reaching these normalized goals, hence the perpetual sense of deficiency Bartky points out.
Haber recognizes the pain associated with abandoning the normalized female body-"there is no denying that it is difficult and frightening to move from what we know to what has not yet existed" (151)-but does not provide substantial suggestions on how to cope. As I mentioned above, Haber advises women to find another means of resistance if the pain is too damaging to their sense of self-worth. The problem is, as Heyes notes, rejecting deeply held norms (and therefore abandoning all hope of attaining them) will almost necessarily be a painful experience of loss and fear (120). It is hard to imagine any form of bodily protest, especially by PhaenEx
Haber"s radical criteria, that will not be damaging to the normalized identities of women. If we are trying to reject the objectification of women"s bodies by phallocentric desire, won"t this necessarily involve cultivating bodies that are in contravention of normalized ideals? How will we overcome the suffering caused by non-conforming bodies (even when these bodies are intentionally cultivated)? If all these practices will be painful, then by Haber"s lights, we shall have to abandon any meaningful resistance, leaving us ineffective as feminists.
McWhorter and Heyes provide an alternative to abandoning resistance. They suggest that non-normalizing practices can be taken up for the pleasure they can provide: "what if we … simply engaged in graduated disciplinary practices for their own sake-for the pleasures they bring-rather than for some goal beyond them?" (McWhorter, Bodies and Pleasures 182). provides the motivation to engage in such practices without the promise of a normative telos, and may help us overcome the pain of our "failed" bodies. Instead of restricting the pleasure we take in our bodies to brief moments of conformity with normalized ideals, we may cultivate nonnormative pleasure in heretofore neglected, or perhaps completely new, aspects of our bodies.
It is this attention to the non-visible aspects of normalization, namely pain and pleasure, that Haber"s account lacks. In light of this oversight, Haber"s worries regarding the difficulties of resistance are well founded. Encouraging women to get "pumped" without recognizing the need to establish new relationships with their bodies, ones that take pleasure in strength, size, and physical capacity, will likely be so self-destructive that the resistant project will fail. Women will have to resign their practices of resistance if they have not cultivated new pleasures to counterbalance the pain of abandoning normalized self-conceptions. While it is true that many feminists would find pleasure in undermining patriarchy, the deep connection between feminine bodily norms and identity would likely render the transformative power of such pleasure ineffectual. It seems unlikely that, without explicit attention to this aspect of normalization, the pleasures of feminist identity will effectively outweigh the pain of a failed feminine identity.
If Haber wishes to base her resistance on a Foucauldian understanding of power and the body, she must take pain and pleasure seriously. It is precisely those "internal feelings" Haber rejects that need to be considered. 16 As Monique Deveaux writes, "women"s "freedom" does not simply refer to subjects" objective possibilities for maneuvering or resisting within a power dynamic but concerns whether a woman feels empowered in her specific context" (224). 17 By neglecting the non-visible constraints on women"s possibilities for resistance, Haber merely reinscribes her resisting women into yet another normalizing scheme. I do not think the creation of new normalizing schemes, even with the best of feminist intentions, are acceptable as part of a resistant practice that should increase possibilities for ways of being, not limit them. PhaenEx This being said, I do believe that the practice of weight lifting can be an ethical practice of resistance. In the next section I will point out one way in which weight lifting might help women cultivate a pleasurable non-normalized experience of their own bodies and be an ethical practice of resistance.
III. The Pleasures of Heavy Lifting
Like Haber, I am interested in challenging the objectification of the female body and identity through normalization. One way we might approach this task is to engage in embodied practices that are not about the way the body looks, rather, about what the body does. Wendy
Burns-Ardolino suggests that promoting an understanding of the body as capacity should be central to feminist liberatory practice. She argues that women should "actively engage" their bodies as capacities to disrupt objectifying norms (Burns-Ardolino 43). She writes, "what is at stake here, then ... is the right to be read as a body having the capacity to act, and having that capacity take precedence over the recognition of the feminine body as object" (Burns-Ardolino 47). As I have argued above, I believe that there are serious problems with a focus on image alone. Thus, I wish to modify Burns-Ardolino"s suggestion to include the right to experience one"s own body as capacity and to take pleasure in it as such.
I propose that the practice of weight lifting may help cultivate an experience of one"s own body as a set of capabilities instead of as a visual object, and as such, be a practice of resistance. While this is not a novel claim, in the context of proselytizing forms of resistance or counterattack, thinking about the ways to present potential practices is important. Haber"s insistence on radical visibility is, as I have argued, likely to be problematic for many women.
Therefore I suggest that a focus on weightlifting as a capacity-building practice might be more successful.
The progressive character of weight lifting makes it a good candidate for bringing attention to the body"s capacities. In order to build strength, one must regularly increase the weight or number of repetitions. Often, lifters record the weight lifted at each training session in order to measure progress. Progress is generally measured by ability to lift, not greater conformity to body norms. Though some exercises focus on the development of visible body parts with relation to normative ideals (tricep kickbacks as a means to prevent "underarm jiggle"), there are many other exercises that do not have particularly visible results (deadlifts, for example).
18
The weight room can be a place where experience of the body as capacity takes precedence over the body as object. Feminist weight lifter Mistress Krista writes on her fitness Taking pleasure in the ability to "lift heavy shit" may, at least temporarily, replace the normative pleasures of looking slim or pretty, and/or the normative pain of failing to do so. 19 In my own experience, for example, the pleasure of doing full push-ups has far outweighed the pain I experienced over non-conforming arms. Even women like myself, who began weight lifting as a means to conform to normative body ideals, may find that the non-normative pleasure of weightlifting can transform the practice into one of freedom. PhaenEx I am not suggesting that all weightlifting is the non-normalizing practice of freedom. As I mentioned, many women, myself included, begin weight lifting as a normative practice. A survey of female celebrities like Jessica Biel, Pink, and Kelly Ripa show that the muscled feminine physique has indeed been "co-opted" into phallocentric desire, at least to some extent.
The co-optation and collusion implied on the cover of one of my weightlifting books would likely horrify Haber: "Lift like a man, look like a goddess," it promises (Schuler) . Nonetheless, I
do think that, when coupled with the critical and creative comportment of Foucault"s artist of the self, weight lifting can be taken up as a practice of freedom and help women to create new, nonphallocentric, non-objectifying ways of being in their bodies.
In general, focusing on practices that cultivate an experience of the body as capacity allows us to widen the pool of potentially resistant practices to include those Haber rejects as insufficiently visible. 20 Markula and Pringle assert that "every body shape has the potential to create a reconstructed self [i.e., a non-normalized or resistant self]," if it is the result of the thoughtful practice of ethics (171). Sports theorist Holly Brubach argues that the bodies of many female athletes, while perhaps resembling normalized bodies, are nonetheless resistant because they are not about the way they look: "their muscles, like the fashion models" slenderness, are hard-earned, but here the means is not abstinence but exertion. Though their bodies have been meticulously cultivated, their bodies aren"t the point: the point is their ability to perform" (Holly Brubach in Heywood, xx). Sports like running, swimming, or martial arts and activities like pilates or yoga, where the bodies cultivated will not necessarily be visibly radical, can therefore be practices of resistance. Contrary to Haber"s claims, practices that appear to "co-operate" with ideal femininity are not necessarily oppressive, and those that do not "are not necessarily "liberating"" (Markula and Pringle 151). Foucault writes that ethical practices of freedom are socially and historically situated: "they are models that he finds in his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society, his social group," and though they may not be pursued as practices of freedom by others, they can be taken up as such by ourselves ("On the Genealogy" 291).
Though I have suggested this focus on capacity in opposition to Haber"s insistence on the visible, the reconceptualization and remaking of the female body as capacity will likely have visible results. Burns-Ardolino suggests that understanding and experiencing one"s body as capacity will lead to "subversive performativity" in which this understanding is played out for others to see (43) . Considering the connection between the constitution of the self and social or political practices, it seems inevitable that changes to the self will affect power more broadly: "self-transformation, then, implies social transformation because institutional and social practices constitute subjectivity" (McLaren, 230) . Indeed, Foucault describes the ethical in partly visual terms: ethics is "a mode of being for the subject, along with a certain way of acting, a way visible to others" ("The Ethics of the Concern of the Self" 286, my emphasis).
This performativity may play out in small ways, not the radical or shocking displays that Haber envisioned. Markula and Pringle suggest that a woman"s focus on core strength at the gym, presumably in distinction to the normative insistence on "flat abs," publicly problematizes the way the "fit feminine body" is constructed (152). I would add that it in fact problematizes the feminine body as a visual object as well. This small choice shows that this woman"s body is not experienced as a mere object, or at least primarily as an object, but as a vehicle for strength and balance (not to mention a pain-free back).
McWhorter notes that the wider variety of women"s bodies we encounter, whether they are actively resisting norms of femininity or are simply "failed" bodies, the less we are able to make generalizations or sweeping characterizations about "women" as a group (McWhorter, "Practicing practicing" 160). She understands Haber as attempting to use this strategy through the recommendation of visibly revolting bodies. Yet, without addressing women"s pleasures and pains in and about their own bodies, it is difficult to see how the proliferation of non-normative body types can be recommended as empowering. Nonetheless, I do agree with the basic point:
the more women we see engaging their bodies as capacities, the less we are able to view them (and ourselves) as objects to be seen. Such performances, though they may seem modest, seem to fulfill Haber"s wishes in a way her muscled woman cannot; they can be both subversive and empowering.
In conclusion, I think Haber is right to point out the utility of our bodies in the fight against normalizing power. On the other hand, I believe her insistence on the visibility of embodied resistance misses the mark. By focusing on a static goal and overlooking the importance of normative pleasure and pain, Haber risks instituting a new normalizing scheme. I have suggested that weight lifting may be more successfully recommended as a practice of resistance when undertaken to increase capacities and for the pleasure of the activity itself, rather than as a means to create the revolting image of female muscle. It is obvious that visibility does have an important role for ethical resistance against normalization, particularly in the ways we connect individual resistance with others; however, I hope to have pointed out that it too can be dangerous.
10 Note that this does not exclude the use of power over others, merely an avoidance of domination. Foucault calls the connection of care of the self to the use of power over others "governmentality" ("The Ethics of the Concern of the Self" 300). McWhorter notes that the exercise of power over others, or the use of governmentality, can be an extension or indeed part of care of the self insofar as it is sometimes necessary to force others to allow one to undertake non-normalizing practices (McWhorter, Bodies and Pleasures 191) . See Melina Bell"s article for discussion of potential regulation changes in body building competitions in order to create space for a feminist practice of body building.
11 It seems to me that this definition is included within the more general one Foucault gives, as questioning or problematization of identities and values is necessary for real change in relation to these to occur. If there is no possibility of questioning the validity of a particular identity then it is likely dominating. An example of this is the dominance of heterosexuality McWhorter describes in Bodies and Pleasures. 16 As aesthetic values are created within power structures, Haber seems to think that if the resisting body becomes aesthetically pleasing and thus desirable to men (and to women informed by normalized desire), the resistant project has failed. She warns against this expansion of male desire as a resistance neutralizing force, asking, "is the muscled woman faced with ... acceptance of her image as another outlet for male desire (in which case she is complicitous with her own oppression)"? (Haber 150) . She also rejects the resistant potential of the professional body builder because these women"s economic well-being is based on their attractiveness to judges or magazine editors which are likely influenced by phallocentric desire . It is not clear to me that desire for a wide variety of female bodies is necessarily the intensification of patriarchal power. In fact, the development of pleasures in, and desires for, all sorts of bodiesboth our own bodies and other"s bodies-seems to be an exciting possibility suggested by Foucault"s work. It is, however, a complicated discussion that I cannot enter into here. In addition, while Haber bemoans the fact that professional body builders must objectify themselves and rely on male desire to make a living, thereby negating their resistant potential
